Given the mistrust
Still that fairie idea . If Wellington really did mistrust the Dutch Belgian ( who stopped Ney at Quatre-Bras ) why would he bother to have them in his army ...
I thought there were instances of the British officers leading, or at least, initiating actions, of DB troops?
Perhaps, and the same for Belgian high ranking officers for British units , for exemple Constant de Rebecque, the chief of staff who by the way saved Welington's ass at Quatre-Bras . He was the one who decided to hold that place against Wellington's first orders
And many DB officiers were saw former service with the french and sometimes even in the olg guard . Still they fought with gallantry . Something that is easely forgotten by some people .
Guys...guys...it's modelling questions I've posed, not political or moral statements.
Miscommunication is more than just about the ability to speak the same language. It is about a common understanding of the language used which implies an understanding of cultural context, doctrine, etc. Example: the Baron de Collaert, commander of the Netherlands cavalry division, was an officer in the French army until as recently a 1 March 1815. Are there no doctrinal differences between the French and British armies that could cause a miscommunication problem? A famous example of miscommunication is that between the Gloucester Regiment at the Battle of the Imjin River (Korean war) and their American commander. When asked about their situation, the Gloucester's commander stated that, "Things were a bit sticky", which is British understatement for "all hell's breaking loose". The American commander took that to mean that things were okay. The results were tragic for the Gloucesters. They were surrounded and overrun.
Back to the 100 days campaign - did all officers at all levels of the Anglo-Allied army speak a common language with sufficient proficiency to communicate properly in the heat of battle? Did they have a common "military" culture - similar experience, doctrine, etc. Anecdotal examples only show that some officers could communicate easily with each other.
Mistrust isn't just about do I like you or not. It also has to do with confidence that someone has an ability to carry out a task as you intended. I might trust you with some cash to do a shopping errand for me, but I might not trust you with doing brain surgery. Awareness of the competence might be one level of trust, but there's a different degree of trust that comes with serving a long time together. Even when officers and their troops come from the same army, there's a different degree of trust from officers and troops that have served a long time together and situations where the troops and officers don't know each other.
As for mistrust of the Netherlanders on the part of the British, we can't go and ask all those now dead British divisional and brigade commanders what they thought, can we? So anything is speculation. There are a whole host of political and practical reasons for including the Netherlands troops in the Anglo-Allied army - not the least of which was it was their national territory. But...that doesn't mean that there might not have been some doubt - rightly or wrongly - in the minds of some British officers. Remember they didn't have the history of the campaign behind them. After all some French officers did desert the Emperor - both before and during the battle. If things started to turn against the Anglo-Allied army then what? The only actual information we have is the disposition of the troops and British attitudes after the battle. Wellington's disposition of troops is ambiguous. There are no clear examples of Wellington trusting critical positions to be held by the Netherlands troops nor are there clear examples that he did not trust them, but regardless of Wellington's attitude it is no guarantee that the same attitude applied to all British officers. (Perponcher's division did hold the critical ground at Quarter Bras did indeed save Wellington, but Wellington did not expect the main attack there and the division was there despite Wellington's orders. So that's not really an example of Wellington trusting them with holding a critical piece of ground, but rather an example of the military astuteness of the Netherlands commanders on the spot. The only real example is how British writers, including those at the battle, downplayed - UNFAIRLY - the contribution of the Netherlands forces. That might only be the British wanting the glory for themselves and may not indicate any mistrust during the battle but even then it doesn't show a high degree of trust.
But all of that may or may not be relevant to the question of modelling. The question is one of modelling the Anglo-Allied army using FoGN concepts for corps and division. For the infantry it's easy....the army was organized into separate divisions for British/Hanoverian, Brunswicker and Netherlands infantry.
In the case of the cavalry, the British/Hanoverian cavalry were not organized into "divisions" but into "brigades". The Netherlands cavalry was organized into a single "division" but didn't really fight in the battles as a "division". We shouldn't necessarily equate real organizational "brigades" and "divisions" with FoGN "brigades" and "divisions". After all, FoGN treats Prussian infantry "brigades" as FoGN "divisions". With respect to the British cavalry "brigades", they were the equivalent size of most French cavalry "divisions" - although both the British "brigades" and French "divisions" would only be a rather small FoGN "division of two (2) small cavalry units. Although I think a cavalry division of just 2 small cavalry units is allowed the authors have indicated that they intend divisions to be larger (see their comments on not allowing FoGN cavalry "divisions" for the French infantry corps). So for modelling the Anglo-Allied cavalry with FoGN we're into the realm of FoGN "virtual divisions" (i.e., FoGN "divisions" that are formed by arbitrary groupings of actual "brigades"). Since it's an arbitrary grouping of real cavalry 'brigades" into "virtual divisions", the decision of what can or cannot be grouped is going to be arbitrary too. The only argument - for me - against allowing British/Hanoverian cavalry in the same "virtual division" as the Netherlands cavalry, is that the infantry have to be in separate divisions, but there are examples in other lists where the infantry are separate divisions but the cavalry can be mixed. The main argument for it is that the Netherlands cavalry didn't fight together as a "division" but as separate "brigades" which would in FoGN terms as small FoGN "divisions" (2 small cavalry units...or less...the 3rd brigades would be only about 6.4 bases, the 1st brigade comes in at 7.5 bases and the 2nd at 6.6. These could be rounded up at 8 bases each or rounded to the nearest even number at 8, 6, and 6 bases).
The conclusion from that is that: (1) if the British/Hanoverian brigades are to small to be FoGN "divisions" and are combined into "virtual divisions", the same should apply to the Netherlands cavalry which are equally small; and (2) from the employment in the actual fighting there's no reason that the Netherlands cavalry brigades should be combined into "virtual divisions" with only Netherlands cavalry brigades since that's not reflected in their actual battlefield employment. However, the counter-argument is that (3) allowing the Netherlands and British/Hanoverian cavalry brigades into the same FoGN "virtual division" is making assumptions about the degree of interoperability* between these forces which may or may not have been the case, but we won't know since these are "virtual divisions".
But....I don't play competition games but historical / scenario games where real orders of battle trump FoGN army lists.
*Note: Interoperability is a huge problem for military forces - even for troops from the same nation. NATO spends a good deal of effort (e.g., developing common doctrine, conducting exercises, etc.) to achieve interoperability but that hasn't prevent the occasional mishap.