Thanks for link againVorskl wrote: ↑Fri Oct 02, 2020 1:49 amThe value of this intelligence is grossly overestimated: while Soviet prepared to meet Germans at north, the main German strike occured at south. Moreover, even at north Rokossovskiy thought Model will strike along the railroad, so he missed the strike direction as well. As for the arty 'pre-strike', its impact is grossly overestimated. If you can, try to find books of Alexei Isaev (I saw there are some printed in English - https://www.amazon.com/Shadow-Zitadelle ... 1912390086 ) He's a modern Russian historian, works for the Russian Ministry of Defense (so be careful with some of his conclusions) but in his books he publishes a lot of first-hand materials from Soviet archives which were not revealed previously.kondi754 wrote: ↑Wed Sep 30, 2020 9:51 amRe: Kursk
I have to confirm that the Russians knew German plan very well, possibly also from their western allies (I'm sure of it, in fact) but they received a lot of information from their spies too.
The Soviets even launched an artillery counter-attack on German units near Kursk just before the start of the German attack, as well as Soviet planes attacked German airfields in early July 1943 with large forces involvement.
Information from Bletchley Park was passed not only to the closest allies but also to the USSR, China and even the communist Tito partisans in Yugoslavia
It is obvious that the British only disclosed to these countries as much as they needed to know, and only as much as not to reveal the source
Of course, this "pre-strike" I mentioned didn't cause great damage, as did the attacks on airfields too, but it clearly shows that Stavka knew the plans of the Germans - I'm not even thinking about the general location of the attack, because it was easy to predict (although, as you wrote, in the north the Soviets chose a different center of gravity in the concentration of troops in defense) but for the precise timing of the attack by the Germans
EDIT. I coudn't agree that the Soviets didn't know about the Manstein/Hoth attack in the south, as the Luftwaffe airfield complex near Kharkov was bombed. Also in the south, more lines of defense were built inward and large armored forces were concentrated both just behind the lines of defense (1st Katukov's Tank Army) and as a strategic reserve (5th Rotmistrov's Tank Army).
Of course, the 5th Tank Army was intended to be used during the Soviet offensive after repelling the German attack, but the course of the battle forced Stavka to use it already at the defense stage - which is a great success for the Germans IMO. I also don't know what was the actual quality and degree of preparation of the Soviet defense lines near Kursk, from what I was able to read, they were actually only small sections turned into fortresses with overlapping fields of fire, and most of them remained at the stage of ordinary field fortifications only with a certain greater saturation of anti-tank resources.